Nominalism is better characterised not as a single metaphysical doctrine, but as a family of heterogeneous theories which share a reluctance to accept the existence of universals and/or of abstract entities. Since one may accept abstract particulars or concrete universals, the rejection of universals and the rejection of abstract entities amount to different positions. Nominalism often has been associated with many other philosophical positions, such as empiricism, materialism, extensionalism, reductionism, and particularism. Strictly speaking, such connections are not in all cases necessary, but they are very common in the history of philosophy.
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