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Good Life, The

Johan Bränmark

Seiten 237 - 240

The question of wherein lies the good life, wellbeing, welfare, happiness, or eudaimonia has been at the centre of moral philosophy since antiquity. These notions might be defined to mean different things, but there is no consensus in the literature on anything but the fact that they are at least closely related. A notion like ‘happiness’ has a subjective ring and might sometimes refer to something like a feeling, but when philosophers study the matter, irrespective of whether they do so in terms of ‘happiness’ or some other notion, they tend to be concerned with how well a person’s life is going prudentially, i.e., for the sake of the person leading the life.

1Department of Global Political Studies, Malmö University

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10 Feldman, F., (2004), Pleasure and the Good Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press.


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