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Frege, Gottlob


Guido Imaguire


Pages 224 - 247



Frege was not particularly interested in mereology. This is due to his conviction that numbers cannot be applied to wholes or aggregates, but only to concepts and their extensions (classes). But, interestingly, Frege explained in a letter to P. Jourdain from 23.09.1902 that he was interested in the difference between wholes and classes at the time he worked on the Begriffschrift, although these reflections leaved no mark ‘in the printed version’. After Russell’s discovery of the contradiction in his system, Frege was compelled to analyse different kinds of collections and totalities. The main question was whether every collection should be considered to be an object or not.




1Department of Philosophy, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro



1 Bell, D., (1987), “Thought”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. 28 (1): 36-50.

2 Bell, D., (1996), “The Formation of Concepts and the Structure of Thoughts”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66: 583-596.

3 Burkhardt, H., (1990), “Wittgensteins Monadologie”, Akten des 14. Internationalen Wittgensteins-Symposiums. Wien, Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 95-100.

4 Frege, G., (1976), Nachgelassene Schriften, Hermes, H. et al. (eds.), Hamburg: Meiner.

5 Frege, G., (1879), Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetische nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle: Von Louis Nebert.

6 Frege, G., (1976), Wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel, in Gabriel, G.; Hermes, H.; Kambartel, F.; Thiel; C.; Veraart, A. (eds.), Hamburg: Meiner.

7 Kemmerling, A., (1900), “Gedanken und Ihre Teile”, Grazer Philosophische Studien 37: 1-30.

8 McKay, T., (2006), Plural Predication, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

9 Wittgenstein, L., (1960), Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

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