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John Woods

Pages 218 - 223

Philosophy’s sensitivity to mereological considerations is often more evident in practice than in formal recognition. Philosophical theories of fiction are a case in point. Although some fictionality theorists expressly invoke the name of mereology – for example, Risto Hilpenen in conversation – this is by a wide margin the exception, not the rule. Two of fiction’s most dominant mereological problems are the fullstory problem for fictional texts (Parsons, 1980, Woods, 2017) and the incompleteness problem for fictional objects.

1Department of Philosophy, University of British Columbia

1 Currie, G. The Nature of Fiction, New York, Cambridge, 1990.

2 Jacquette, D., (1966), Meinongean Logic: The Semantics of Existence and Nonexistence, Berlin: De Gruyter.

3 Parsons, T. Nonexistent Objects, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980.

4 Reicher, M. E.“The Ontology of Fictional Characters”, in Eder, J.; Jannidis, F.; Schneider, R. (eds.), Characters in Fictional Worlds: understanding imaginary beings in literature, film and other media. Revisionen. Grundbegriffe der Literaturtheorie. Bd 3 (2010): 111-133.

5 Thomasson, A. L. Fiction and Metaphysics, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

6 Woods, J. The Logic of Fiction, second edition with a Foreword by Nicholas Griffin, volume 23 of Studies in Logic, London: College Publications, 2009; first published with the subtitle Philosophical Soundings of Deviant Logic, The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1974.

7 Woods, J.“Truth in Fiction: Rethinking its Logic”. Forthcoming in 2017.


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