- Volume 1 (2017)
- Vol. 1 (2017)
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- Issue 1
- No. 1
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- Pages 213 - 218
- pp. 213 - 218
Early in the 20th century Russell characterised facts – which he also called
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10 Russell, B., (1919), “On Propositions: what they Are and how they Mean”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplement 2: 285-320.
11 Simons, P., (2010), “Relations and Truthmaking,” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume vol. 10, 1: 199-213.
12 Wittgenstein, L., (1961), Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, (trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, London: Allen & Unwin.