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Conscious Experience


Michael Silberstein


Pages 160 - 168



Discussions about mereology and conscious experience, e.g., qualia, subjectivity, etc., are difficult for a few reasons. First, unlike physical entities, there is no agreement as to whether part and whole talk even applies sensibly to conscious experience. Whether it does apply to conscious experience or not depends on which feature of conscious experience is being focused on such as its first-person nature, or more generally one’s conception of conscious experience. There are many different and incompatible conceptions of conscious experience out there, such as eliminativism about qualia versus consciousness as an entity, and they each have different mereological implications.




1Department of Philosophy, Elizabethtown College



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