The use of mereology in the investigation of causation remains in its infancy, despite the fact that in 1843 J. S. Mill presupposed the relevance of mereological concepts to causation. Doubts about whether causation is a real relation explain this retardation. Throughout most of the twentieth century, philosophers assumed that causation should be represented as a quasi-logical operator on pairs of statements. If causation is best represented as a statement operator, there need be no entities related by causation and thus no application for mereology. In contrast, if causation a real relation, then it has relata, and these relata may have parts.
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